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Terry: Terry: When Procedure Moonlights as Reason

When Procedure Moonlights as
Reason, There is Nothing Left to
Abuse
I

Greenstreetv. Social Security Administration
I. INTRODUCTION

The phrase "abuse of discretion" carries with it the connotation of judges
running amok, deciding disputes willy-nilly, and doing justice a grave disservice.
And rightly so, but for the phrase to have any meaning whatsoever, there must
first exist some leeway that a judge took too far. That is, if a decision-maker is
tasked with merely comparing his checklist to the situation at hand and then tallying up a final score to determine the ultimate outcome, the above phrase has no
application; discretion cannot be abused when it does not exist in the first place.
Therefore, where Congress has granted broad discretion to arbitrators' decisions
in certain contexts, Congress has told any court reviewing an arbitrators' decision
to keep its hands off unless the evidence is overwhelmingly clear that the arbitrator went beyond his bounds.
But in Greenstreet v. Social Security Administration,2 when the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals could not discern exactly what basis upon which an arbitrator acted, it leapt past any presumption in favor of the arbitrator's discretion and
found that what an arbitrator did not do was an abuse of his decision-making volition, just as an act beyond his prescriptive powers would have been an abuse of
discretion. So, in attempting to weed out the arbitrariness in the arbitration
processes that decide workplace punishments, the court heaped needless and unreasoned process squarely into the arbitrator's path, thereby greatly lessening the
amount of discretion he had in the first place.
11. FACTS AND HOLDING
Lance Greenstreet was an eleven-year veteran of the Social Security Administration (SSA), where he worked as an IT Specialist. In March 2006, he confronted
a coworker about some of his missing "valued property." 3 In the argument that
ensued, Greenstreet swung his cane, knocked over a flower pot and, perhaps more
importantly, a computer. 4 As a result of this incident, he was placed on administrative leave, and in July of that year was fired.5
The employees' union filed a grievance on his behalf, challenging the termination-as well as demanding back pay, leave and benefits-and invoking the
1. 543 F.3d 705 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
2. Id.
3. Brief for Petitioner at *3, Greenstreet v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 2008 WL 713381 (Fed. Cir. 2008)
(No. 2007-3312).
4. Id. The parties stipulated that the amount of damage Greenstreet caused was $1,100. Id.
5. Greenstreet, 543 F.3d at 706.
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arbitration clause in its collective bargaining agreement with the SSA. 6 His grievance was not heard until April 2007, and during that hearing, Greenstreet argued
that termination was too severe a penalty, though he conceded his actions warranted a suspension of some kind. 7 In July 2007-342 days after he was firedthe arbitrator issued his decision, which stated that a "substantial suspension is the
maximum reasonable penalty" considering the circumstances. 8 The decision or9
dered the SSA to reinstate Greenstreet to his prior position but without back pay.
Greenstreet then appealed the arbitrator's decision to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.' 0 Because one of the criteria by which the court is to
review an arbitration decision is whether it is arbitrary," Greenstreet's main point
on appeal was that the arbitrator's decision amounted to the imposition of a 342day suspension, the length of which was arbitrarily set by the amount of12time that
elapsed between his misconduct and the date of the arbitrator's decision.
The SSA, in response, argued that the only precedent supporting this proposition-the per se arbitrariness of so-called "time served" suspensions-is found in
the decisions of an administrative review board, which are not binding on a federal court.' 3 The SSA instead proffered a line of cases where the Federal Circuit
had upheld "time served" suspensions, arguing that, these penalties are not arbitrary on
their face; therefore they can be upheld when the circumstances call for
4
them.'

The Federal Circuit, however, held that basing the length of an employee's
suspension solely on "time served" is arbitrary, vacated that portion of the arbitrator's decision, and remanded for consideration the appropriate length of Greenstreet's suspension. 15
1II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. The Civil Service Reform Act
The procedure by which the Federal Circuit acquires jurisdiction in a case
like this, and the manner by which it is required to review an arbitrator's decision,
are products of federal statutes collectively titled the Civil Service Reform Act of
1978 (the Act). 16 The Act is "a comprehensive revision of the laws governing the
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id. The arbitrator noted Greenstreet's lack of a disciplinary record, the fact that he paid for the
damaged property, his satisfactory work performance, and SSA's failure to consider rehabilitation in
finding for Greenstreet as to his reinstatement. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 707. Judicial review of an arbitrator's decision as it pertains to federal employees is provided by 5 U.S.C. § 7121(f) (2006). Jurisdiction is vested in the Federal Circuit by 5 U.S.C. §
7703(b)(1) (2006).
11. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(c)(1) (2006). This statute and the appellate court's responsibilities thereunder
will be discussed in fuller detail later in this note.
12. Greenstreet,543 F.3d at 707.
13. Id. at 708.

14.
15.
16.
sions

Id. at 708-09.
Id. at 706, 710.
Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-454, 92 Stat. 1111 (1978). The various proviof the act are codified throughout scattered sections of the United States Code.
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rights and obligations of civil servants, [and] contains the first statutory17 scheme

governing labor relations between federal agencies and their employees.'
Specifically, the Act permits, inter alia, certain federal employees to challenge adverse employment actions to the Merit Systems Protection Board
(MSPB).' s The MSPB must sustain the agency's decision if it was supported by
the required level of evidence. 19 An appeal beyond the MSPB (or the arbitrator,
as will be explained below) is permitted and is exclusively the province of the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. 20 The Federal Circuit is to review
the record of the appeal and set aside any action, finding, or conclusion that is
"arbitrary,
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with
21
law."

Because one of the purposes of the Act was to "strengthen the position of
federal unions and to make the collective-bargaining process a more effective
instrument,' 2 2 the Act forces federal agencies and their employee union counterparts to come up with a grievance procedure and binding arbitration for resolving
disputes. 23 Interestingly, arbitration may only be invoked by the agency or the
union, not the grieving employee. 24 Appeals from an arbitrator's decision are also
heard by the Federal Circuit, which is to apply the same standard had the decision
been handled by the MSPB. 25 As noted by the U.S. Supreme Court, the reason
that judicial review of both arbitrators' decisions and decisions of the MSPB is
26
conducted in the same manner is "to assure conformity" between the decisions.
That does27 not mean that the Federal Circuit is bound by the MSPB's decisions,
however.

The arbitrator or the MSPB is required to analyze an employer's adverse action under the Douglas test (or Douglas factors). 28 In Douglas v Veterans Administration,the MSPB ruled that an agency must consider a number of specific factors in determining an appropriate penalty.2 9 The twelve factors include the nature
17. ATF v. Fed. Lab. Relations Auth., 464 U.S. 89, 91 (1983).
18. 5 U.S.C. § 7701 (2006). The circumstances in which an aggrieved party may appeal to the
MSPB are covered by 5 U.S.C. §§ 4303, 7512; most pertinent here is "removal." Id. § 7512(1).
19. Id. § 7701(c)(1).
20. Id. § 7703(b)(1). Jurisdiction can also be found in the statute Congress enacted when first creating the Federal Circuit in 1982. See 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(9) (2006).
21. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(c)(1). The statute also allows the Federal Circuit to overturn any finding "obtained without procedures required by law, rule, or regulation having been followed" or "unsupported
by substantial evidence." Id. § 7703(c)(2)-(3).
22. Fed. Lab. Relations Auth., 464 U.S. at 107.
23. 5 U.S.C. § 7121(a)-(b). Specifically, the grievance procedure must include procedures that
"provide that any grievance not satisfactorily settled under the negotiated grievance procedure shall be
subject to binding arbitration." Id. § 7121 (b)(1)(C)(iii).
24. Id. § 7121(b)(l)(A)(iii).
25. 5 U.S.C. § 7121(0; see also Cornelius v. Nutt, 472 U.S. 648, 652 (1985) ("The arbitrator is to
apply the same substantive standards that the Board would apply if the matter had been appealed...
."). The authority wielded by an arbitrator is to be neither more nor less than that of the MSPB. Devine
v. Pastore, 732 F.2d 213, 216 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
26. Cornelius, 472 U.S. at 661 n.16.
27. Crispin v. Dep't of Commerce, 732 F.2d 919,923 n.4 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
28. Douglas v. Veterans Admin., 5 M.S.P.B. 313, 331-32 (1981). Thousands of decisions have
invoked this case when considering the appropriate sanction to be meted out against an malcontent
employee. Edward H. Passman & Bryan J. Schwartz, In the Name of Security, Insecurity: The Trend to
Diminish FederalEmployees'Rights, 21 LAB. LAW. 57, 72 (2005).
29. Douglas, 5 M.S.P.B. at 331-32.
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and seriousness of the offense, the employee's past record, consistency of the
penalty with those imposed upon other similarly situated employees, the potential
rehabilitation, and mitigating circumstances. 30 The reviewer-be it the MSPB or
an arbitrator-need not specifically consider all twelve factors, and may consider
anything else that is potentially relevant. 31 In essence, the underlying
32 issue is
whether the penalty falls under the general auspices of reasonableness.
B. The Dawn of "Time Served"
The main source from which the Greenstreetcourt divined its authority was a
1955 decision of the U.S. Court of Claims, the predecessor to the Federal Circuit. 33 In Cuiffo v. U.S., the plaintiff lost his job at a Brooklyn, N.Y., Army port
for taking home some lumber that he mistakenly thought had been discarded.3 n
Under the appeals process available at the time, Cuiffo, the plaintiff, appealed his
dismissal to the Civilian Personnel Grievance Review Board, which took into
account his good work record and general reputation for honesty in restoring him
to duty.33 Importantly, the board considered the time 36
between losing his job and
then regaining it "non-pay status and just punishment.,
In reviewing Cuiffo's punishment-which amounted to a 320-day timeserved suspension-the Court of Claims noted that the Department of the Army
had a "Table of Standard Penalties," which stated that theft was to be punishable
by either dismissal or a suspension of one to ten days. 37 The Board said dismissal
would be inappropriate; however, the resulting suspension was thirty-two times
the maximum punishment allowable for the offense according to the Army's own
regulations. 38 The Court of Claims then reasoned that the "punishment was de39
termined by accident and not by a process of logical deliberation and decision."
It held40 the punishment to be "arbitrary and unfair," and therefore the court set it
aside.
Cuiffo exists, as it were, on a bit of an island. No U.S. court decision citing it
does so to address the issue of time-served suspensions.4 1 Yet from this decision,

30. Id. at 332.
31. Parker v. U.S. Postal Serv., 819 F.2d 113, 1116 (Fed. Cir. 1987) ("[Tlhe factors discussed in
Douglas were not exhaustive of all factors which might be considered in a particular case and, by the
same token, not all of the twelve factors would be pertinent in every case .... ").
32. Maj. Timothy J. Malloy, ProceduralIssues in Merit Systems ProtectionBoard Practice, 35 A.F.
L. REV. 279, 280 (1991).
33. See Greenstreet v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 543 F.3d 705, 708 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Cuiffo v. U.S., 137 F.
Supp. 944 (Ct. Cl. 1955).
34. Cuiffo, 137 F. Supp. at 945.
35. Id. at 946.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 949.
38. Id. at 950.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. The vast majority of the cases that do cite Cuiffo do so for a procedural issue not addressed here.
See, e.g., Morelli v. U.S., 161 Ct. Cl. 44 (1963) (discussing ability to waive appeal to Civil Service
Commission). Only one case appears to cite Cuiffo for its discussion of damages, but not in the same
manner discussed here. Moten v. U.S., 229 Ct. Cl. 796 (1982) (discussing characteristics of cases
where penalties were reversed).
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the MSPB and the Federal Circuit have addressed the appropriateness of these
types of suspensions in differing ways.
C. The MSPB and FederalCircuit Take Different Paths
There are several cases where the MSPB has held these suspensions to be arbitrary, as illustrated by Fulks v. Department of Defense.42 Fulks attempted to
make it clear that penalties determined merely by reference to the time between
43
the adverse employment action and the date of the decision are per se arbitrary.
In this case, the MSPB even went so far as to overturn previous decisions in which
time-served penalties were upheld even when the arbitrator conducted a thorough
Douglas factors analysis."
Two years after the Fulks decision, the Federal Circuit addressed the issue of
time-served suspensions and in so doing paid short shrift to the MSPB's reasoning
proffered in Fulks.4 In the case Stilley v. Department of Veterans Affairs, the
court stated that the general rule of law is that time-served suspensions can be
responsible for the removal action'
appropriate if the employee is "'at least in 'part
46
and 'some personnel action was justified.'
The two main cases the Stilley court relied upon were prefaced upon the Back
Pay Act, which states that an employee found to have been affected by an unjustified personnel action that led to a loss of pay is entitled to receive the pay for the
period in which the personnel action was in effect once the action is corrected.
In the American Federation case, an arbitrator expressly mitigated a loss of
job to a fifteen-day suspension without pay for an Immigration and Naturalization
Service worker who was found to have fraudulently processed green cards for
foreign nationals. 48 The court there held that the Back Pay Act only applied when,
for example, an arbitrator has reversed an agency-imposed termination or suspension, not when it merely mitigates a removal.49 Where an arbitrator has found the
employee as responsible for the
action as the agency, she can expressly deny back
50
pay as part of the punishment.
And in Ollett v. Department of Air Force, the court relied upon American
Federationin stating the general rule that an award of back pay is not required by
51
the Back Pay Act when a penalty is mitigated from termination to suspension.
42. See, e.g., Fulks v. Dep't of Defense, 100 M.S.P.R. 228, 237-38 (2005) (citing Belldina v. Dep't
of Justice, 50 M.S.P.R. 497, 501-02 (1991), declined to be followed by Stilley v. Dep't of Veterans
Affairs, 225 F. App'x. 889 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (per curium); and Montalvo v. U.S. Postal Serv., 50
M.S.P.R. 48,49-51 (1991)).
43. Fulks, 100 M.S.P.R. at 237-38. In this case, the MSPB found a time-served suspension of 20
months, 13 days to be arbitrary and instead imposed a 120-day suspension on a teacher who fell asleep
on the job. Id. at 239-40.
44. Id. at 239.
45. See Stilley, 225 F. App'x at 890.
46. Id. at 890 (quoting Ollett v. Dep't of Air Force, 253 F.3d 692, 694 (Fed. Cir. 2001)); see also
Am. Fed'n of Gov't Employees, Local 2718 v. Dep't of Justice, 768 F.2d 348, 351 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
47. 5 U.S.C. § 5596(b)(1)(A)(i); Ollett, 253 F.3d at 694; Am. Fed'n of Gov't Employees, 768 F.2d at
350.
48. Am. Fed'n of Gov't Employees, 768 F.2d at 350.
49. Id. at 350-51.
50. Id. at 351.
51. Ollett, 253 F.3d at 694.
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The court here was forced to parse the arbitrator's ruling because it equally appeared that the arbitrator was reversing an agency imposed termination as it did
mitigating the penalty of removal. 52 It remanded the case for clarification but kept
intact the rule of law American Federationhad espoused.53
In Stilley, a nurse who ordered laboratory tests for herself was fired but reinstated after the arbitrator's decision. 54 The arbitrator did not award back pay, and
the plaintiff did not argue that the lack thereof violated the Back Pay Act, but
instead amounted to an improper time-served suspension. 55 The Federal Circuit
noted that the arbitrator acted appropriately in considering the mitigating circumstances that supported the imposition of a suspension rather than termination, and
thus, it found no fault with the decision. 56 The Federal Circuit even expressly
noted that MSPB decisions like Fulks "of course do not affect the outcome of
[this] case" even if they seem to be inconsistent with the governing law of the
circuit.57 The court gave considerable deference to the arbitrator, holding that the
time-served suspension was not arbitrary under the circumstances. 58
However, there is an open question as to whether Stilley is good law: the decision was not selected for publication, which, in part, led the Greenstreet court to
dismiss its precedential value. 59 Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1 states
that courts may not prohibit or restrict the citation of federal judicial opinions
published after January 1, 2007.60 This newly enacted rule was intended to create
a uniform regulation throughout the federal system whereby "a court of appeals
may not prohibit a party from citing an unpublished opinion of a federal court for
its persuasive value or for any other reason.' 61 The Federal Circuit's own rules
deal with opinions or orders specifically designated as "nonprecedential," as Stilley was, stating that any decision so designated is not mandatory authority but
instead merely persuasive. 62 Therefore, because Stilley
was not selected for publi63
cation, it remains merely persuasive in its authority.
IV. INSTANT DECISION
At its core, the choice the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals had to make in
Greenstreet v. Social Security Administrationwas between the express prohibition
against time-served suspensions in the nonprecedential Fulks line of MSPB cases,
and the express sanction of time-served suspensions as articulated by the equally
nonprecedential Stilley decision. The Federal Circuit went with Fulks and the
52. Id. at 695.
53. Id.
54. Stilley v. Dep't of Veterans Affairs, 225 F. App'x 889, 889-90 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (per curiam).
The arbitrator stated that because the employee was denied union representation, as provided in the
collective bargaining agreement, the agency's evidence against her could not be used. Id. at 890.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. See Greenstreet v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 543 F.3d 705, 709 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (noting that Stilley was
a "nonprecedential decision").
60. FED. R. APP. P. 32.1.
61. FED. R. APP. P. 32.1 advisory committee's note.
62. FED. CIR. R. 32.1 (d).

63. Id.
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cases and timeMSPB, and found that the analysis needed
64 for Back Pay Act
served decisions were inherently different.
The Greenstreetcourt distinguished the American Federationand Ollett cases
because they "did not involve an arbitrariness challenge to the length of a suspension" but merely a challenge to their lost wages. 65 Stilley was found inapposite
because (1) the arbitrator there made no affirmative findings of the appropriateness of the length of the suspension; (2) Stilley only challenged her suspension as
disproportionate to the offense whereas Greenstreet argued that his suspension
and (3) Stilley rewas inappropriate because it was based solely on time served;
66
lied upon two cases whose backbone was the Back Pay Act.
In contrast, the court found the Cuiffo reasoning to be "sound" and that punishment "determined by accident, and not a process of logical deliberation," is
inherently arbitrary. 67 It found that permitting a suspension based solely on "time
served" would ignore the Douglas factors and make one's suspension determined
not upon the individual circumstances of the case, but the speed at which the judicial system operates. 68 The court clarified its approach when it said that a suspension "coincident with or nearly coincident with 'time served"' is not completely
foreclosed; the court emphasized that where the length of suspension is solely
based on time served would it be vacated. 69 Because the arbitrator in Greenstreet's case used the Douglas factors only to assist his decision with regard to
termination as an appropriate penalty-and conducted no analysis, the court said,
was
as to the appropriate length of any suspension-the degree of punishment
70
based only upon time served and was therefore vacated for being arbitrary.
V. COMMENT

Notwithstanding any judgment on its final disposition in the case, there are
several problems with the Federal Circuit's reasoning in Greenstreet. Firstly, it
relied primarily on a fifty-year-old case in which the basis for the court's decision
is not entirely clear. Secondly, it dismissed out of hand a more factually similar
and more recent case on the basis, at least in part, of being nonprecedential. And
thirdly, in framing the issue as it did, the court clarified little and missed an opportunity to lay down a firm rule of law in an area where little guidance exists.
The Cuiffo case has several strikes against it. First, it was decided in 1955, or
53 years before the Federal Circuit made its decision in Greenstreet. No opinions
Cuiffo for its supposed proscription against
issued prior to Greenstreet
7 have cited
time-served suspensions. '
Most damaging, though, is that it represents an unhealthy commingling of
administrative and purely judicial lawmaking. Famously, the promulgation of
administrative bodies, such as the MSPB, has been labeled the Fourth Branch of
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

Greenstreet,543 F.3d at 709.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 709- 10.
Id. at 710.
Id.
Id.
See cases cited supra note 41.
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government. 72 Their mere existence-especially in the sense of the MSPB, a
judicial-like body created by Congress-raises constitutional separation of powers
issues. 73 Yet, clearly, courts are supposed to give the fact-finding and decisionmaking ability of these administrative bodies great 74deference, only overruling the
agency under certain expressly outlined conditions.
The Greenstreet court, of course, did what it was allowed to do when it deferred to the MSPB's findings. 75 However, the court, without any analysis as to
the source of the rule of law it was about to adopt, summarily adopted the
precedent (stemming from Cuiffo) that had been first adopted by an administrative
body, the MSPB.76 In fact, in so doing, the Federal Circuit went so far as to state,
"we proceed with caution when asked to depart from twenty-five years of MSPB
precedent.''77 If anything, the court should have proceeded with caution when
asked to adopt twenty-five years of MSPB precedent, especially considering there
was Federal Circuit authority on point. As one scholar has noted, "[p]erhaps additional procedural safeguards, or a harsher standard of review, would be appropriate.,78
Furthermore, it is not perfectly clear upon what basis the Court of Claims
made its decision in Cuiffo. Remember, the Army had a table designating the
length of appropriate suspensions for different offenses, and the time-served suspension in that case amounted to thirty-two times longer than the suspension provided for by the regulation.7 9 Yes, the court there did say the suspension was
"arbitrary," but it also stated the suspension "was out of all proportion to the offense." 80 It is not unreasonable to conclude that the "determined by accident, and
not by a process of logical deliberation and decision" language so heavily relied
upon by the Greenstreet court defines a decision as arbitrary where it is out of
proportion with the offense. In other words, the two thoughts-"arbitrary" and
"out of proportion"-are not necessarily two distinct lines of reasoning, but may
be mere synonyms. Cuiffo could just as easily be read to mean different things:
that the suspension was arbitrary because it was out of proportion to the offense,
that being out of proportion to the offense is a factor that leads to a conclusion that
a suspension is arbitrary, or that the suspension it levied was determined by accident because little heed was paid to the Army's regulations.
Therefore, given the whole of the circumstances, it is an unfortunate smoothing of the edges to say Cuiffo stands simply for the proposition that the length of a
suspension is necessarily arbitrary when based upon the employee's time served,
as the Greenstreetcourt did. 81 In this later decision, the Federal Circuit pays little

72. Fed. Trade Comm. v.Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470,487 (1952) (dissenting, Jackson, J.).
73. Peter B. McCutchen, Mistakes, Precedent and the Rise of the Administrative State: Toward a
Consitutional Theory of the Second Best, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 2 (1994).
74. Id. at 41.
75. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(c) (2006) (describing the role of the reviewing court in cases first heard by the
MSPB).
76. Greenstreet v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 543 F.3d 705, 709 (Fed. Cir. 2008) ("We conclude that the
reasoning of Cuiffo, consistent with the holdings of the MSPB, is sound . .
77. Id. at 708 (emphasis added).
78. McCutchen, supra note 73, at 41.
79. Cuiffo v. U.S., 137 F. Supp. 944, 950 (Ct. Cl. 1955).
80. Id. at 949-50.
81. Greenstreet, 543 F.3d at 709.
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attention to the "out of proportion" language and indeed even goes so far as to
find Stilley inapposite at least in part because the challenge in that case was based
on an "out of proportion" theory.
Cuiffo, in sum, does not automatically stand for what the Federal Circuit said
it stood for in Greenstreet. The court should have found something else on which
to hang its hat, and the defense provided just such support when citing to Stilley.
That the court dismissed this case, mainly for its supposed lack of precedential
value and because the supporting cases relied upon the Back Pay Act, is unfortunate.
As an introductory matter, the fact that courts can even designate some opi-83
nions as persuasive rather than mandatory authority is a matter of some debate.
As one scholar notes, "[tihe premise that judges can and should make [a] determination [as to a decision's precedential value] at the moment a ruling is made, and
without the benefit of input from others, is seriously flawed." 84 In not designating
Stilley for publication, the Federal Circuit was in essence making a prediction as
to its future value and promulgating the fiction that only judges-and not their
fellow lawyers as well as legal commentators--can draw out the full meaning of
their opinions. 85 The Federal Circuit, it seems, when handing down the Stilley
decision, underestimated the decision's importance to the narrow issue of timeserved suspensions, and in not selecting it for publication stacked the deck that the
court was to use later in Greenstreet. The Greenstreet court certainly took note
that Stilley was of lower precedential value, and while it is impossible to know
how much that fact led to the court dismissing it as authority, the fact remains that
Stilley was found inapposite. 86 Had Stilley been on equal authoritative footing
with Cuiffo, it is not unfair to wonder if the outcome would have been different.
And perhaps the Greenstreet court would not have had to resort to logical
mind tricks to distinguish the Stilley case from the case at bar. The Back Pay Act,
in expressly allowing for the denial of a suspended employee's pay, seems to be a
clear codification of time-served suspensions: when mitigating a firing to a suspension under the Back Pay Act, to deny pay during the time in which an employee is suspended has exactly the same effect as, after the fact, handing down a
a time-served suspension, something strongly disfavored by the Federal Circuit in
Greenstreet.
Even though a disallowance of back pay and a time-served suspension without pay are essentially the same thing, the Greenstreet court goes to great lengths
to differentiate the two. The court here proffers that the Douglas factors are better
followed by proscribing time-served suspensions than by the rule of law promulgated in Stilley.87 And this is the biggest problem with the court's seemingly
commonsensical decision in Greenstreet. Where the Stilley opinion left a certain
amount of discretion to the person or panel imposing the penalties, the Green82. See id.
83. See Scott E. Gant, Missing the Forest for a Tree: Unpublished Opinions and New Federal Rule
of Appellate Procedure 32.1, 47 B.C. L. REV. 705, 706 (2006) ("Critics of unpublished opinions
charge that they permit appeals courts to suppress precedent, lead to the dedication of insufficient
attention to unpublished dispositions, and are inconsistent with principles of judicial accountability.")

84. Id. at 726.
85. Id. at 727-28.
86. Id.
87. See id. at 710.
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street decision takes that discretion away when it says that time served cannot be
the sole basis for the length of the suspension. 88 But in the same breath, the court
further says that a suspension whose length is coincidental
with the amount of
89
time served does not fall within the general proscription.
While not logically incongruent, such reasoning probably leaves arbitrators
scratching their heads. Let us take a hypothetical example. A government employee breaks an agency rule regarding parking spaces, devilishly stealing the
director's prime spot on far-too-often an occasion. He is told to knock it off, and
when he does not, he is fired. Understandably upset over the loss of a good, loyal
employee, his union representative files a grievance against the agency, and the
cause goes to binding arbitration as dictated by the collective bargaining agreement between the employee's union and the agency. For some reason or another,
only three days have elapsed between the date the agency director fired the employee and the date the arbitrator handles the grievance. The arbitrator decides
that the best course of action would be to give the employee his job back, without
back pay, a penalty that amounts to a three-day, unpaid, time-served suspension.
It was, after all, only a dispute about a parking space. He flagrantly broke the
rules, the arbitrator might reason, but he did not deserve to lose his job.
Under Stilley and the Back Pay Act, this would appear to be perfectly fine.
An arbitrator has the discretion to deny back pay when the employee is at least as
responsible for the adverse action as the employer was, i.e., when the employee
screws up and then the employer takes the punishment too far.
Under Greenstreet,the legality of the arbitrator's action in our hypothetical is
not clear. The opinion purports to pay heed to the arbitrator-friendly Douglas
factors, but at the same time it prevents the arbitrator from being able to base the
length of the suspension solely on the amount of time-served. But in the same
breath, the suspension might pass Greenstreet muster as coincidental to the
amount of time served. So the arbitrator needs to be able to justify exactly a threeday suspension-even if a suspension of similar length would have realistically
sufficed just as well. Even if the arbitrator believes a "short" suspension is required under the circumstances, in the end, how can one possibly differentiate
between a three-, four-, or five-day suspension, assuming the absence of a military-style table of prescribed punishments? What possible set of circumstances
would lead an arbitrator to opine, as Goldilocks would, "Yeah, two days is too
short, but three is just right"?
Greenstreet demands such differentiation--that the arbitrator render an impossibly objective decision when given a thanklessly subjective task. The arbitrator needs to specifically justify the length of the suspension even though the principles of equity guiding her decision are inherently vague. Time-served, in this
hypothetical, may simply just fit. A short suspension is required under the circumstances; it is utterly impossible to say with to-the-day precision exactly how
much time an employee should lose pay. Furthermore, there is no justification in
forcing an arbitrator to articulate exactly why three days is the right length, nor is
there any reason for an arbitrator to expressly justify a suspension of a different
length just to avoid the appearance of a now-proscribed time-served suspension.
88. Id.
89. Id.
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The Federal Circuit in Greenstreet would have been better off combining the
rule espoused in Stilley and the Back Pay Act-that time-served suspensions can
be justified under the right circumstances-with the rule in Cuiffo, that suspensions so out of proportion to the offense are inherently arbitrary.
That essentially seems to be the crux of the Greenstreetcourt's concern. After all, the arbitrator did look to mitigating factors under Douglas and did feel that
a very long suspension was justified. 90 The arbitrator, unable as any rational,
reasoning human being would have been, to determine precisely how long the
employee should have been suspended, probably felt that 342 days was simply
"long enough," even if that thought was not expressly articulated in the decision.
If actually applying the Douglas factors did not placate the court, maybe the
arbitrator needed only to have articulated a nice, round number of days for which
the employee should have been suspended, though such a decision does not smack
one as inherently more just and would furthermore appear to be the very definition
of arbitrary. Or perhaps underlying its decision, the court felt that a nearly yearlong suspension for breaking a computer---especially one for which restitution
was provided-was "out of proportion" to the actual offense. But it certainly did
not say that, and it instead planted a needless and pointless hurdle in front of an
arbitrator's decision-making progression.
What Greenstreet amounts to, then, is a mere item on an arbitrator's checklist, and not a solidification or articulation of a needed rule of law. If an arbitrator
feels that a time-served suspension equitably fits the circumstances, she must now
simply articulate a post hoc rationalization so as to avoid the perception that the
length of the suspension was left to chance. Even though there really should be
nothing wrong with crafting a solution that an arbitrator feels equitably suits the
situation, arbitrators are impeded from doing so by this decision.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Federal Circuit Court of Appeals was on the right path. Certainly, the
court is right to require arbitrators to justify their decisions, and all would be better served if such decisions were not based on whims. But in missing the emphasis of a decades-old case, ignoring an on-point case at least in part because it was
not selected for publication, and awkwardly distinguishing between the denial of
back pay to a suspended employee and a de facto suspension without pay, the
court tripped over its own reasoning. What it felt were competing doctrines are
not really mutually exclusive provisions, and the combination of the two would
have simplified and codified a doctrine of law where one did not previously exist.
What results by its decision, then, is not a tool by which arbitrators can make
sure their decisions are just, but a mere procedural task, easily surmounted not by
reasoned analysis, but only by a post hoc excuse. Despite language decrying an
arbitrary result, the Greenstreet court at its core is merely concerned with procedure-procedure that, it should be said, seems very arbitrary.

MATTHEW E. TERRY
90. Id.
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